Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
The existence of funding gaps has generated intense debates in both economic theory and public policy for more than two decades. Accordingly, economic scientists have done a great deal of research to study the effects of financial constraints on entrepreneurship: Do individuals lack the chance of following their calling to be an entrepreneur because financial institutions hold back their funds? In the seminal article Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that information asymmetry leads to inefficient credit rationing. However, in a dissenting paper de Meza and Webb (1987) argue that information asymmetry induces overfinancing for entrepreneurs. Since governments and scientists identified entrepreneurship as an important source for employment and growth (Audretsch, 1995) , the importance of this discrepancy has increased. of funds that provides 500 Mio. Euro for equity-investments in high-tech start-ups. Furthermore, a 240 Mio. Euro state-owned fund was established which directly invests in newly founded firms.
The recent literature does not give a uniform answer to the question whether entrepreneurs are financially constrained.
3
Theoretical and empirical results of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Evans and Leighton (1989) suggest a positive relationship between starting an own business and wealth.
However, Cressy (2000) shows that this positive correlation may simply reflect a decreasing absolute risk aversion. Wealthy individuals have a higher inclination to take on risky assets such as starting their own businesses.
Empirical research on financial constraints for entrepreneurs has to deal with two major pitfalls. First, financial constraints cannot be measured directly.
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Second, wealth as the most common proxy for the release from financial constraints may be endogenously determined.
5 Xu (1998) shows that individuals considering potential self-employment accumulate wealth prior to their decision to switch into self employment. Cressy (1999) argues that wealth is an indicator of the individual's ability. In another paper, Cressy (1996) finds no relationship between the access to bank finance and wealth for entrepreneurs of comparable ability.
To control for these effects and make results more consistent empirical re-search can take two approaches: first, exogenous increase in wealth might be employed as proxy for the release from financial constraints. Second, instead of testing for differences between groups of individuals the effect might be tested for a group of individuals having the same or similar characteristics.
Most studies focus on avoiding the endogeneity problem. Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994) use inheritance as an exogenous increase in wealth. Black, de Meza and Jeffreys (1996) investigate the impact of an increase in housing prices in the U.K. on the number of business registrations nationwide. Although a positive relationship between these indicators and entrepreneurship is found, the validity of the results may be questioned. The studies lack to test whether such a relation also exists for individuals that are otherwise fairly similar, but differ with respect to wealth increase. Following the path of Black et al. (1996) for the U.S.A, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) find no relationship between business entry and housing capital gains over most wealth groups. Only for the top 5 % wealthiest people the increase in financial resources via housing market gains had a significant impact on entrepreneurship.
Windfall gains or unexpected payments are a more appropriate proxy for exogenous wealth increases than housing capital gains. Nonetheless, research on how windfalls affect the propensity to become entrepreneur is limited so far. By analyzing Swedish micro data Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) find that the probability of being self-employed increases when people receive windfall gains in the form of inheritance and lottery winnings. Similarly, Taylor (1999) uses U.K. panel data from the British Household Panel (BHPS) to find that the type of windfalls matters. Redundancy payments increase but job-related bonus payments decrease the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. These non-uniform results point again to the necessity of controlling for the windfall receiver's type by forming groups of individuals that are fairly comparable except for their level of exogenous wealth increase.
In our paper we want to contribute to this debate by formulating a dy- 
Theoretical Model
In this section we develop a simple expected utility model of risk-neutral individual's behavior. Consider a person who divides her total available time of workingL between her own business activity L t , and time of working for somebody else,L − L t . Her utility is a linear function of consumption, C t , and work (L t ,L − L t ). κ and ι are disutility coefficients of working. β is the discount factor. We assume a strict preference for consumption in the present period. The present value of a gain in the future from saving in period t is less than the loss in utility from foregone consumption in period t. E 0 is the expectations operator conditional on time 0 information set Ω 0 .
(1)
The individual maximizes equation (1) The second constraint is the person's expected income in the case of selfemployment, where θ is a measure of "entrepreneurial abilities", 0 < α < 1, 0 < γ < 1, I t is investment in the business, and ξ is a log-normal disturbance whose logarithm has variance σ 2 ξ and E(ξ) = 1. At the time when investment decision is made, the risk-neutral person does not know the realization of ξ.
Financial frictions are introduced through the third constraint, (I t −S t ) ≤ f (S t ) and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier λ t . f (S t ) is the borrowing capacity. At time t the person can borrow not more than f (S t ), where S t is the saving and f (S t ) > 0. If the planned borrowing, I t − S t , exceeds the borrowing capacity the constraint holds as equality, I t − S t = f (S t ), and the individual is financially constrained.
The phenomenon of borrowing capacity falling behind the desired borrowing level may be due to the fact that lenders limit their downside risk by binding the amount of credit on the borrower's lending capacity. Lending capacity is determined by S t which can also be interpreted as the amount of equity that the potential entrepreneur puts into his business.
Equation (5) is the transversality condition which prevents the person from borrowing an infinite amount and consuming it. Solving the optimization problem we derive the following first-order conditions for investment, labor hours and saving for self-employment:
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Given the strict preference for current consumption as defined above, β r bt+1 < 1 and λ t > 0. If financial constraints ease, that is if f (S t ) increases, then λ t decreases. Note that in the absence of financial constraints, when λ t = 0, the individual invests until marginal product of capital equals interest rate for borrowing. However, in case of λ t > 0, I t marginal product of capital exceeds interest rate.
The optimal values of invested capital and hours spend in self-employment for the financially constrained person is:
Intuition suggests that the individual would change the hours devoted to her business when the degree of financial constraints changes. As shown in equation (8) below, when the level of financial constraints decreases, the person is more likely to spend more time in her own business,
The negative relationship between financial constraints and time spend in start-up business is due to an opportunity cost effect. If financial constraints are eased the increased level of investment generates a gap between the marginal return and the marginal opportunity costs of entrepreneurship. By increasing the time spend in start-up business the individual equalizes both again.
As a measure of financial constraints we employ a windfall gain proxy.
The intuitive reason is that windfalls provide the would-be entrepreneur with additional money that is neither dependent on his ability nor on his accumulated wealth. Being exogenous, windfall gains have the effect of independently relaxing financial constraints and increasing the propensity to enter entrepreneurship if such constraints exist. Thus, taking the argument in reverse, for similar groups of individuals a positive dependence between the propensity to enter entrepreneurship and the exogenous windfall proxy proves that financial constraints limit entrepreneurship.
On the basis of our theoretical predictions, the individual i becomes an entrepreneur at time t if L it > 0. We estimate the following specification of the reduced form self-employment selection equation
where i indexes individuals, t corresponds to periods, L it is a dummy variable equal to one if the person decided to be self-employed in the next period and zero otherwise, λ it−1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the person got windfall gains and zero otherwise in the previous period, Z it is a vector of the person specific variables, X t is a set of time dummies, and Λ is the c.d.f.
of the logistic distribution. We also apply a number of selection criteria to the data. First, we drop all unemployed people from our analysis. Second, we excluded individuals older than 65 and younger then 20 years old. Descriptive statistics for the annual means of all variables employed in the analysis are described in Table   1 . From Table 1 we see that about one percent of individuals started their own businesses, and 3 percent of individuals received windfall gains.
In our analysis of subsamples of individuals, we focus on the applicability of the general model to a group of similar persons rather than testing for differences between groups of individuals, which would impose the constraints across these groups.
First, we investigate the effects of financial constraints on entrepreneurship by wealth quartiles. Descriptive statistics by income quartile are described in Table 2 . We can see that about one percent of individuals becomes self-employed. Moreover, richer people are likely to get their wealth from windfall gains.
Second, we categorize individuals by abilities. We proxy the individual's abilities as individual specific term from the following regression
where i is individual index, t is time index, Income it is total household income, educ it is the amount of education or training in years, exper it is the length of time with firm in years, married it , sex it , age it and age 2 it is defined as before. Finally u i is an individual specific term which can be interpreted as a proxy of the person's abilities.
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Descriptive statistic by abilities quartiles is described in Table 3 .
Econometric Results
In this section we present the estimation results on the link between the propensity of being self-employed and windfall gains. Based on the prediction of the dynamic partial equilibrium model, we hypothesize that individuals are more likely to start their businesses when they get unexpected wealth.
The results of estimating Equation (9) are given in Tables 4-6. Table   4 presents results from regressions of self-employment dummy variable on windfall gains and our control variables for sex, household size, age, age squared, marriage, education and origin.
Five different regression models are presented. In model (1), we examine the correlation between propensity of being self-employed and windfall gains, controlling just for sex. In model (2) we also control for age and age squared.
9 See Griliches (1977) for more details.
Place of birth and marriage are controlled for in model (3). Finally, we control for household size and education in models (4) and (5) (5) and significant at the 10 % level. Moreover, women are less likely to start their own businesses. This is also found in Lindh and Ohlsson (1996) . Table 5 reports results for the four income quartiles of individuals. For each quartile, we report just estimates of model (5). The results vary dramatically. The poorest people in the sample are not affected by windfall gains. They are more likely to start a busines when they are getting older.
Moreover, household size and university education also have a positive effect on their propensity of starting own businesses. The model is not successful for the second income quartile, even though there is positive, but statistically insignificant relationship between windfall gains and entrepreneurship. Positive and statistically significant relationship between entrepreneurship and windfall gains is observed for the third income quartile. The coefficient on windfall is 0.950 compared to 0.448 for all individuals. Finally, the results for the forth quartile indicate that "the very rich" people are less likely to start their own business when they get windfall gains. Moreover, there are negative and statistically significant coefficients on education dummies and sex. Thus, depending on the level of income, windfall gains have a distinct impact on self-employment. Our results support Hurst and Lusardi (2004) who find that the propensity to become a business owner in the United States is a non-linear function of wealth. However, they concluded that only at the top of the wealth distribution there is a positive and significant relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship, whereas our own study identifies only the group of individuals with an upper-medium wealth level as sensitive to exogenous wealth increases.
We also find an interesting difference in the results for ability quartiles reported in Table 6 . The positive and statistically significant relationship between entrepreneurship and windfall gains is observed for the second ability quartile. The coefficient on windfall gain variable is 1.228 comparing to 0.448 for all individuals. Interestingly, a negative relationship between the same factors is observed for the forth quartile. This might be interpreted as the best abilities' people do not have any financial constraints and could get sufficient funds without obstacles. The people from the second ability quartile have enough skills, but lack funds to start their businesses. The insignificant positive relationship for the first quartile can be explained by the fact that these people do not have enough skills to start own business.
In summary, we find clear support for the hypothesis of Equation (8).
Individuals are more likely to start their businesses when they get windfall gains. The results differ for different income and ability quartiles. The windfall gains have much higher effect on the propensity of being self-employed when a person has sufficient levels of abilities and income. However, "too rich" and "too smart" people do not face any financial constraints. Policy-wise these results imply that state programs promoting start-up creation need to be refined. In particular, our research suggests that such programs should concentrate more on specific target groups. An appropriate design of programs requires that promotion is bound on personal characteristics of potential entrepreneurs.
The natural next step in our line of research is the investigation of how windfall gains affect the survival of the entrepreneur's business. If windfalls influence the fate of the business as well, then financial constraints do not only exist prior to entrepreneurship but also during the lifetime of the business.
Given that financial constraints are a result of asymmetric information such an investigation would also give some clues about how effectively banks learn 16 their clients' type during a financing relationship. Furthermore, since the existence of financial constraints and the efficiency of a certain policy design is probably linked to the financial system a country employs, cross-country studies on financial constraints and entrepreneurship are in order. Note: p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, N is sample size, while σ 2 and µ represent its variance and mean respectively. 
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